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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OVERVIEW
During this survey period the Tenth Circuit grappled with a variety
of constitutional questions. From its earnest and helpful attempt to ap-
ply and clarify the concept of flexible due process in a trilogy of govern-
ment employment cases to its knee-jerk application of a century-old rule
to uphold the constitutionality of a state law banning religiously moti-
vated polygamy, the court has dealt with these issues with varying de-
grees of proficiency.
The cases addressed in this article cover a wide range of important
constitutional issues. In addition to due process and freedom of reli-
gion, the Tenth Circuit examined the constitutionality of the Utah Drug
Paraphernalia Act, the free speech protections of door-to-door public
service solicitation, and the validity of Wyoming's election laws. Of spe-
cial interest to Colorado, the court ruled on the constitutionality of the
state's water conservancy district system and the state supreme court's
attorney disciplinary procedures.
I. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE: POTTER V. MURRAY CITY
In Potter v. Murray City,' the Tenth Circuit rejected an opportunity
to reexamine the constitutional implications of a statutory ban on all
polygamy, even if entered into on the basis of a good faith religious
belief. The court blindly relied upon the 1879 landmark case, Reynolds v.
United States,2 ignoring current free exercise clause analysis.
A. Facts and Tenth Circuit Decision
The plaintiff, Royston E. Potter, was employed as a police officer for
the defendant, Murray City. While employed by Murray City, Potter had
two wives. The defendants "terminated plaintiff's employment because
of plaintiff's religious beliefs and practices and particularly by reason of
his plural marriage or cohabitation and for his failure to support, obey
and defend Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of
Utah."
3
The defendants stipulated to the following facts: 1) the plaintiff's
polygamy was the result of a good faith religious belief; 2) such beliefs
were immune from state scrutiny; 3) neither the plaintiff's two wives nor
his five children were either neglected or deprived; 4) the plaintiff's
wives had consented to the plural marriages; and, 5) the plaintiff's per-
formance as a police officer was "exemplary" and unaffected by his mul-
1. 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 145 (1985).
2. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
3. Potter v. Murray City, 585 F. Supp. 1126, 1128 (D. Utah 1984).
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tiple marriages.
4
Potter brought this action under the free exercise clause of the first
amendment 5 and under the Civil Rights Act.6 He sought damages
against Murray City, the city's Civil Service Commission, and Police
Chief Gillen, and sought declarative and injunctive relief against the
State of Utah, its Governor, and its Attorney General to declare Utah's
anti-polygamy constitutional provision and statute void. 7 The district
court, at the request of Utah, joined the United States as a party because
the act enabling Utah to join the Union was conditioned upon a ban on
polygamy.
8
The Tenth Circuit based its decision on the fact that the Supreme
Court's 1879 Reynolds decision upholding a conviction for bigamy over a
free exercise claim has never been directly overruled. 9 The court cited a
number of cases relying upon Reynolds to support the proposition that
" '[the] activities of individuals, even when religiously based, are often
subject to regulation by the States in the exercise of their undoubted
power to promote the health, safety and general welfare.' "10 The
Tenth Circuit apparently concluded that the Supreme Court's subse-
quent cases are in complete accord with the Reynolds free exercise analy-
sis. The court therefore deferred a reexamination of the
constitutionality of a state ban on religiously motivated polygamy.
Reynolds stands for the idea that the free exercise clause protects
only religious beliefs from prohibition under the states' police powers.
Religiously motivated actions obtain no first amendment protections
under Reynolds.' I Although Reynolds was the ratio decidendi of Potter, the
Tenth Circuit did appear to show some awareness of the modern
trend. 12
B. Discussion
1. Reynolds v. United States
Both the trial and appellate courts, but more emphatically the
Tenth Circuit, relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Reynolds v.
4. Id. at 1129. In addition, the parties stipulated that between 5,000 and 10,000
members of polygamous families resided in Utah; that there had been only 25 criminal
prosecutions for polygamy in Utah since 1952; that there had been no criminal prosecu-
tion of the plaintiff; and that the Utah Department of Employment Security had not denied
him unemployment benefits. Id.
5. "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]
.... "U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. Potter, 585 F. Supp. at 1128. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
7. Id. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (1953) codifies the mandate of article III, § I of
Utah's constitution by making polygamy a third-degree felony.
8. Potter, 585 F. Supp. at 1128. The Utah Enabling Act, Act ofJuly 16, 1894, 28 Stat.
107 (1894).
9. 760 F.2d 1065, 1068-70 (10th Cir. 1985).
10. Id. at 1069 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972)). See ibifa note
18 and accompanying text.
11. See infra text accompanying note 15.
12. 760 F.2d at 1069 n.6.
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United States. '3 In Reynolds, the Court dealt with the question of whether
the free exercise clause would protect an individual from criminal con-
viction under a federal anti-polygamy statute when the defendant had
taken a second wife with the permission of his church and in the good
faith belief that it was his religious duty to do so on pain of eternal dam-
nation. 14 In affirming the defendant's conviction, the Court espoused
the belief-action dichotomy in free exercise clause analysis.1 5 The Court
held that while the free exercise clause provides absolute protection to
individual religious beliefs, the government is completely unfettered by
the first amendment in the regulation or prohibition of religious
actions. 16
The plaintiff's argument that the Supreme Court's later decisions
have overruled Reynolds was prematurely rejected by the Tenth Circuit.
While the belief-action dichotomy is still recognized, actions motivated
by sincere good faith religious beliefs have been offered protection from
government regulation when the regulations are not in the least restric-
tive form available to serve compelling state interests, thus unduly in-
fringing upon the free exercise rights of individuals. ' 7 The district court
did make a half-hearted attempt to apply this "least restrictive alterna-
tive-compelling interest"'18 requirement as an alternative to the belief-
action dichotomy theory. 19 Almost as an afterthought, the Tenth Cir-
cuit in Potter declared that the state's ."compelling interest" in banning
polygamy is to protect the "fundamental values" of the monogamous
marital relationship. 20 The court never mentioned the state's burden of
proving a "compelling interest." The court also failed to examine the
possible alternative means of protecting this alleged interest which
would be less destructive to the plaintiWs religious practices. 2 1 The
court was satisfied that monogamy is so "inextricably woven into the
fabric of our society" that it was unnecessary to examine whether or not
13. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
14. In Reynolds, the plaintiff proved at trial that the accepted doctrine of "the Church
of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints, commonly referred to as the Mormon Church,
. . . [was] that the failing or refusing to practice polygamy . . .would be punished, and
that the penalty . . . would be damnation in the life to come." Id. at 161.
15. Id. at 166.
16. "Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere
with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices." 98 U.S. at 166; cf. Free-
man, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 806, 826 (1958) (constitutional pro-
tection of free exercise must, by definition, mean protection of actions taken in the practice
of religious beliefs).
17. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (state interest in regulating un-
employment benefits does not outweigh religious conviction against producing weapons);
see also, Freeman, supra note 16.
18. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718; see also Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S.
574, 602-04 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); United States v. Dick-
ens, 695 F.2d 765, 772-73 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1092 (1983). See generally, L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-10 (1978).
19. L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 855.
20. 760 F.2d at 1070.
21. In fact "the state defendants have not presented any empirical evidence that mo-
nogamy is superior to polygamy, nor has the Utah Legislature ever considered whether its
anti-polygamy laws are wise." Id. at 1069.
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the state could pursue alternatives less burdensome upon the plaintiffs
admittedly sincere and legitimate religious belief and practice.
2 2
The cases cited by the court in support of Reynolds2 3 referred to
Reynolds for the very limited proposition that actions motivated by sincere
religious belief are not entirely immune from state regulation to pro-
mote health, safety and general welfare. 24 The Supreme Court's adop-
tion of the "least restrictive alternative-compelling interest" test for
determining the limited conditions under which free exercise rights may
be burdened in these cases demonstrates a conscious abandonment, if
not an implicit overruling, of Reynolds' broader holding that the free ex-
ercise clause provides no protection for religiously inspired acts. 2 5 At
the very least, the current Supreme Court free exercise analysis required
the Tenth Circuit to reexamine the polygamy issue in that light. 26 The
Supreme Court's current framework for analysis requires the govern-
ment to present evidence proving the existence of some compelling gov-
ernment interest 2 7 which would be substantially undermined by the
granting of a narrow exemption tailored to avoid a substantial burden
on the specific religious practice in question. 28 Since the defendants in
Potter offered no evidence to support the assertion that Utah had a com-
pelling state interest in the exclusivity of monogamy as its sole marital
22. It is interesting that the district court did discuss this possibility but found it im-
possible to allow a religiously based exception to Utah's polygamy prohibition that would
not "engulf the prohibition itself.., irremediably eroding the police power of the state
and its compelling interest." 585 F. Supp. at 1140. The Tenth Circuit omitted any analy-
sis weighing less harmful alternatives or balancing the competing interests.
23. In addition to the Tenth Circuit's omission of the "least restrictive alternative"
arm of the Supreme Court's free exercise test, it is significant that the court affirmed with-
out comment the district court's holding that "the question of a compelling public interest
is one of law to be determined by the court," not one offact to be proven by the state to the
satisfaction of the trier of fact. 585 F. Supp. at 1142 (emphasis added). Such an analysis
emasculates the requirements of Reynolds and is unsupported by authority. The cases
make it clear that the question of compelling state interest is one of fact. The burden of
proving that fact rests upon the governmental entity seeking to impinge upon the free
exercise rights of an individual in furtherance of those interests. See infra the cases cited in
note 27. The Tenth Circuit's silence on this issue leaves it unclear whether it has adopted
the district court's maverick position on this question.
24. 760 F.2d at 1069-70.
25. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 603; Lee, 455 U.S. at 257; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219-20; Sherbert,
274 U.S. at 403; Dickens, 695 F.2d at 772; United States v. Carroll, 567 F.2d 955, 957 (10th
Cir. 1977) (dicta).
26. "The Court rightly rejects the notion that actions, even though religiously
grounded, are always outside the protection of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. In so ruling, the Court departs from the teaching of Reynolds v. United
States. . . promis[ing] that in time Reynolds will be overruled." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
at 247 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). Referring to Reynolds, Professor Tribe has noted
that "[flew decisions better illustrate how amorphous goals may serve to mask religious
persecution . . . . The question, after Sherbert, must be whether the monogamy-promo-
tion goal is sufficiently compelling, and the refusal to exempt Mormons sufficiently crucial
to the goal's attainment to warrant the resulting burden on religious conscience." L.
TRIBE, supra note 18, at 854.
27. " 'The state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essen-
tial to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.' " Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 603 (quot-
ing Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58); see also, Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718; 'oder, 406 U.S. at 215;
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
28. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 604; Lee, 455 U.S. at 258-61; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718-19;
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407; Dickens, 695 F.2d at 772.
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form, 2 9 and demonstrated an absolute failure to consider alternatives
less harmful to the plaintiff's sincere religious beliefs and practices, 30
Potter should have been granted the summary judgment relief he re-
quested. The longevity of the rationale for this decision by the Tenth
Circuit is in doubt.
II. FREEDOM OF SPEECH
A. Door-to-Door Public Interest Canvassing: Association of Community
Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Municipality of
Golden
In ACORN,3 ' a public interest group successfully challenged the
constitutionality of a municipal ordinance requiring door-to-door can-
vassers to apply to the city council for exemptions before being permit-
ted to canvass for support.
1. Facts
ACORN is a non-profit corporation whose purpose is to organize
low and middle-income people on the neighborhood level to petition
for redress on issues of importance to their community.3 2 Through
door-to-door canvassing they solicit donations, inform people of
ACORN's work, encourage the signing of petitions, and encourage
membership in the organization.3 3 In the fall of 1980, they planned to
canvass support in the city of Golden, Colorado, for opposition to the
Colorado Public Service Company's planned utility rate increase and
winter disconnect policy.
34
ACORN was aware of the existence of a Golden municipal ordi-
nance which generally prohibited uninvited door-to-door solicitation.3 5
The ordinance provided for an exemption to be granted by the city
council upon its determination that such door-to-door canvassing was
for charitable, religious, patriotic, or philanthropic purposes or "other-
wise provide(d) a service or product so necessary to the public welfare of
29. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
30. The Tenth Circuit never addressed the issue. The trial court, however, found that
no religious exception to the rule could be permitted without swallowing up the prohibi-
tion of polygamy. The court appeared to fear that "[tihe gate would be open ... to
everyone who might desire more than one wife at a time" leading to the demise of monog-
amy through "the false assertion of religious motivation for physical gratification." 585 F.
Supp.at 1139.
31. 744 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1984).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 742.
35.
"It is illegal for any person, firm or corporation... to solicit or have solicited in
its name money, donations of money or property, or financial assistance of any
kind; or to conduct polls, opinion samples or other informational canvassing
from house to house or from business to business within the city limits unless so
invited or requested by the owners or occupants of the house or business."
Id. at 741-42 n.l (quoting GOLDEN MUN. CODE § 4.44.010 (1974)).
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the residents of the city" that it could not be considered a nuisance.3 6
No other decision-making criteria were delineated by the ordinance.
Groups seeking exemptions were to file written applications with the city
containing, among other things, the purpose for the canvassing and the
intended use of the funds solicited. 3 7 Violation of the ordinance was a
misdemeanor.
38
After consulting counsel, ACORN decided not to apply for the ex-
emption. ACORN maintained that their activities did not fall within the
activities qualifying for exemption and that the requirement of an appli-
cation for an exemption abridged their first amendment rights.
3 9
ACORN sent the city a letter informing it of the date of the canvass, and
providing a list of the canvassers, a description of ACORN's program,
and its Colorado certificate of registration. 40 The canvassing went for-
ward on November 5, 1980, as planned, and the following day the
Golden police told the canvassers to cease and desist and issued several
citations. 4 ' The canvassing stopped shortly thereafter and ACORN
brought suit in federal district court against the city of Golden and the
Golden Police Department under sections 1983 and 1988 of the Civil
Rights Act, and under the first and fourteenth amendments, seeking to
enjoin enforcement of the ordinance.
42
The trial court found for the defendants. 4 3 The court reasoned that
since it was likely that ACORN would have been granted an exemption
36.
"Exemptions. The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to persons and orga-
nizations granted exemptions. The city manager shall issue exemptions to per-
sons and organizations after the city council has determined that such solicitation
. . . [or polling] . . . is [for a] charitable, religious, patriotic or philanthropic pur-
pose or otherwise provides a service or product so necessary for the general wel-
fare of the residents of the city that such activity does not constitute a nuisance to
the residents of the city."
744 F.2d at 742 n.l (quoting GOLDEN MUN. CODE § 4.44.020 (1974)).
37.
"In order to obtain an exemption as provided for in this chapter, the applicant
shall file with the city manager a sworn application in writing containing the fol-
lowing information:
A. The applicant's name and the names and addresses of officers and direc-
tors of such applicant;
B. The name and purpose of the cause for which the exemption is sought
and the specific anticipated use of the proceeds or information;
C. The method whereby the goods or services are to be sold and delivered,
donations solicited or polls conducted;
D. The time period during which the solicitation, peddling or polling is to
be carried on;
E. Whether or not any commissions, fees, wages or emoluments are to be
expended in connection with such solicitation, peddling or polling, and the
amounts thereof."
744 F.2d at 742 n.l (quoting GOLDEN MUN. CODE § 4.44.030 (1974)).
38. "Any person violating the provisions of this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor
and. . . shall be subject to a fine of not less than ten dollars, nor more than one hundred
dollars." Id. (quoting GOLDEN MUN. CODE § 4.44.040).




43. Id. at 744.
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had it applied for one, the only question to be decided was whether an
ordinance requiring an application for an exemption for door-to-door
canvassing was unconstitutional on its face.4 4 The district court stressed
that although the ordinance could be characterized as vague and indefi-
nite, it was not unconstitutional because it was the city council and not
the police who made the decision as to which groups received
exemptions.
4 5
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit, Judge Holloway writing, overturned the lower
court's ruling, finding the ordinance unconstitutionally vague on its face
and an unjustifiable "time, place, and manner" restriction on the plain-
tiffs' first amendment rights.
4 6
The city's argument that ACORN never applied for an exemption
and had therefore never been denied an exemption from the ordinance
brought the issue of ripeness before the Tenth Circuit. The court held
that the denial of an exemption was unnecessary in a facial challenge to
a law alleged to violate the first amendment.4 7 The Tenth Circuit also
acknowledged that the Supreme Court has held that when faced with a
law requiring the acquisition of a permit or license as a prerequisite to
exercising the first amendment right of free speech, an individual or
group is free to ignore the prerequisite.
48
The Tenth Circuit also found that the language of the ordinance
setting out the grounds for an exemption was impermissively vague.
Unlike the district court, the majority's concern for the imprecision of
the ordinance was not assuaged by the fact that the decision to grant or
deny a permit was made by the Golden City Council instead of by the
police.4 9 The court held that vague and imprecise laws regulating free
expression give municipal officials the "unguidt._ discretion" to arbi-
trarily decide which groups are entitled to exercise their first amend-
ment rights.
50
The Supreme Court has found public service solicitation, as prac-
ticed by ACORN in this case, to be protected under the first amend-
ment.5 ' Laws licensing or permitting first amendment rights of free
44. Id. at 743-44.
45. Id. at 743.
46. Id. at 750 (McWilliams, J., dissenting). Judge McWilliams agreed with the trial
court.
47. 744 F.2d at 744.
48. Id. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969); Jones v.
Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 602 (1942)(Stone, J., dissenting), vacated, 319 U.S. 103 (1943);
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
49. 744 F.2d at 747.
50. Id.
51. Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947 (1984) (25% ex-
pense limit ordinance vacated); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (75% charitable use of funds ordinance vacated); Hynes v.
Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (advance notice of political canvassing ordinance
vacated); see also ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1983) (canvassing
and soliciting clearly protected by first amendment).
1986]
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expression have always been carefully scrutinized. 5 2 The Court has re-
quired such laws to be narrowly drawn so as to effectuate compelling
government interests with a minimum of adverse effect on first amend-
ment rights. 53 The Tenth Circuit found Golden's anti-solicitation ordi-
nance overly broad in general, but took special exception to the
ambiguous drafting of the exemption section. 54 This section provided
insufficient procedures and decision-making criteria with which to guide
the council and to prevent arbitrariness in the exemption granting pro-
cess. 5 5 The Tenth Circuit found the city's case-by-case method to be
"precisely the sort of discretionary process that the Supreme Court has
condemned."
5 6
Golden's final defense was that the ordinance was a reasonable
"time, place, and manner" restriction serving a legitimate government
interest.5 7 A reasonable "time, place, and manner" restriction is one
which is content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve important govern-
ment interests, and leaves open ample and adequate alternate means for
dissemination of the message. 58 The Supreme Court has also found
that free speech may not be denied in one place merely because there
are alternate forums for expression in existence elsewhere. 59 Although
alternative, more expensive, and perhaps less effective forms were avail-
able to ACORN, a denial of an exemption would have silenced its pri-
mary means of disseminating its message. Granting exemptions for
organizations which the council found charitable, scientific, or "neces-
sary for the general welfare" required an impermissible inquiry into the
content of the applicant's message. 60 Such a requirement is not content
neutral, and as such was an unconstitutional "time, place, and manner"
restriction. 6 1 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit's rejection of Golden's ordi-
nance is in harmony with recent Supreme Court decisions.
62
52. Munson, 467 U.S. 947; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (attorney regulation
prohibiting encouragement of racial discrimination suits overbroad); Thornhill v. Ala., 310
U.S. 88 (1940) (anti-picketing ordinance overbroad); Schneider v. N. J., 308 U.S. 147
(1939) (anti-leafletting ordinance overbroad); Strasser v. Doorley, 432 F.2d 567 (1st Cir.
1970) ("newsboy" licensing ordinance overbroad); Natco Theatres v. Ratner, 463 F. Supp.
1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (Movie theater licensing ordinance overbroad).
53. Button, 371 U.S. 415.
54. 744 F.2d at 748.
55. Indeed, examples of past grants and denials of exemptions showed a lack of pro-
cedural continuity and a penchant for arbitrary decisions. See 744 F.2d at 748 nn.6 & 7.
56. 744 F.2d at 749 (citing Munson, 467 U.S. at 959 n.12).
57. Id. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); Adderly v. Fla.,
385 U.S. 39 (1966).
58. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 3069 (1984);
National Drug Coalition, Inc. v. Bolger, 737 F.2d 717, 723 (7th Cir. 1984).
59. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 163.
60. 744 F.2d at 749.
61. Id. at 750. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,461 (1980) (regulation of speech in a
public forum must be narrowly drawn to serve substantial state interests); Police Dept. v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (first amendment denies government the power to re-
strict expression due to content).
62. Regan v. Time, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 3262, 3265 (1984) (prohibiting reproduction of




B. Drug Paraphernalia Laws: Murphy v. Matheson
In Murphy v. Matheson,6 3 Murphy, the owner of a "head shop,"
brought a pre-enforcement challenge to the Utah Drug Paraphernalia
Act,64 seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Act and also seeking a de-
claratory judgment that the Act was unconstitutional. 6 5 Murphy's claims
under the first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Consti-
tution were, first, that the Act's overly broad language unconstitutionally
restricted the free flow of commercial and non-commercial speech and,
second, that the Act's vagueness and its forfeiture-without-hearing
clause violated due process protections.
66
1. Facts
The Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act in
1981 in an attempt to combat drug use. 6 7 The Act first defined drug
paraphernalia as any physical object used or intended to be used at any
stage in the illicit controlled substance use process, from inception to
ingestion.6 8 It also included a non-exclusive list of such items for illus-
trative purposes. 69 The next section listed "logically relevant factors"
for the trier of fact to consider in determining whether or not an object
was "drug paraphernalia." 70 The Act made it a criminal offense to pos-
sess or use drug paraphernalia or to knowingly deliver or advertise drug
63. 742 F.2d 564 (10th Cir. 1984).
64. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37a-1 to 37a-6 (Supp. 1985).
65. 742 F.2d at 567.
66. Id.
67. "It is the intent of this chapter to discourage the use of narcotics by eliminating
paraphernalia designed for processing, ingesting, or otherwise using a controlled sub-
stance." UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-2 (Supp. 1985).
68.
As used in this chapter. "Drug paraphernalia" means any equipment, product
or material used, or intended for use, to plant, propagate, test, analyze, package,
repackage, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or to otherwise introduce
a controlled substance into the human body in violation of chapter 37, title 58,
and includes, but is not limited to: [a list of twelve types of items].
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-3 (Supp. 1985).
69. Id.
70.
In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, the trier of fact, in addi-
tion to all other logically relevant factors, should consider:
(1) Statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concern-
ing its use;
(2) Prior convictions, if any of an owner, or of anyone in control of the
object, under any state or federal law relating to a controlled substance;
(3) The proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of
this chapter;
(4) The proximity of the object to a controlled substance;
(5) The existence of any residue of a controlled substance on the object;
(6) Instructions whether oral or written, provided with the object concern-
ing its use;
(7) Descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or depict
its use;
(8) National and local advertising concerning its use;
(9) The manner in which the object is displayed for sale;
(10) Whether the owner or anyone in control of the object is a legitimate
1986]
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paraphernalia. 7 1 Finally, the Act declared that no property rights could
exist in these items, eliminating any need for a hearing before or after
their taking. 7 2 Therefore, the district court found the statute constitu-
tionally sound in all of the challenged areas and the plaintiff appealed.
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The plaintiff asserted that the Act's ban on advertising drug para-
phernalia 73 unconstitutionally restricted the free flow of commercial
speech. 74 He further argued that even if his individual conduct were not
protected, the overbreadth doctrine allowed him to assert the rights of
others whose first amendment rights could be substantially infringed by
the Act. 75 The Tenth Circuit, Judge Holloway writing, held that the
overbreadth exception to standing requirements did not apply in com-
mercial speech cases. 76 The court noted that the chilling effect on a
supplier of like or related items to the community, such as a licensed distributor
or dealer of tobacco products;
(11) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of the object to
the total sales of the business enterprise;
(12) The existence and scope of legitimate uses of the object in the commu-
nity; and
(13) Expert testimony concerning its use.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-4 (Supp. 1985).
71.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use,
drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store,
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled sub-
stance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who violates
this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, or possess with intent to deliver,
or manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack,
repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a
controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act. Any person
who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the person
making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper,
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5 (Supp. 1985).
72. "Drug paraphernalia is subject to seizure and forfeiture and no property right can
exist in it." UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-6 (Supp. 1985).
73. UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(4) (Supp. 1985). See supra note 71.
74. 742 F.2d at 567.
75. Id. See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620,
634 (1980) (third-party overbreadth challenge of charitable solicitation ordinance);
Broadrick v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601, 610-12 (1973) (third-party overbreadth challenge of
state employee anti-partisan politics statute).
76. 742 F.2d at 568 (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc., 455 U.S. 489,497 (1982) (overbreadth doctrine doesn't apply to commercial speech);
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565 n.8 (1980)
(overbreadth doctrine not applicable to electric utility advertising); Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350, 381 (1977) (not applicable to attorney advertising); Stoianoffv. Mont., 695 F.2d
1214, 1224 (9th Cir. 1983) (not applicable to drug paraphernalia advertising); New Eng-
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third party's exercise of free speech has been held unlikely to occur in
the commercial speech area because the strong profit motive involved
will resist regulatory restraints. 77 The Tenth Circuit therefore con-
cluded that the plaintiff had no standing to make a facial challenge to the
statute by asserting the commercial speech rights of others.
78
The court also rejected the plaintiffs first amendment claims made
on his own behalf. The court relied primarily on the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
79
which upheld a village ordinance regulating the sale of smoking accesso-
ries displayed within close proximity to literature encouraging the use of
controlled substances. The Tenth Circuit concluded that such speech
was speech proposing an illegal transaction and therefore was not pro-
tected by the first amendment. 80 Any effect the ban may have had on
legitimate commercial speech was held to be minimal.8 ' A statute must
substantially infringe upon first amendment rights in order to be found
unconstitutionally overbroad. 8 2 "That some unconstitutional applica-
tions of the law can be imagined is insufficient to invalidate the statute
on overbreadth grounds."
8 3
The Tenth Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs claim that the Act was
void for vagueness in violation of due process.8 4 Laws carrying criminal
penalties may be challenged as unduly vague. 85 Criminal violations
must be clearly defined so that a person of ordinary intelligence has a
reasonable opportunity to be informed as to what conduct is prohibited.
They must also provide explicit standards to prevent arbitrary and capri-
cious enforcement. 86 The Tenth Circuit examined the Utah Drug Para-
phernalia Act for vagueness in terms of whether the language of the
statute was sufficient to provide fair notice and fair enforcement.
Murphy based the "fair notice" prong of his vagueness attack upon
section 3 of the Act which defines drug paraphernalia as "any. . . prod-
uct . . . used, or intended for use to . . . grow, . . . manufacture, . . . [or]
land Accessories Trade Ass'n v. City of Nashua, 679 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1982) (not applica-
ble to drug paraphernalia advertising)).
77. 742 F.2d at 568 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565 n.8; Bates, 433 U.S. at 381).
78. 742 F.2d at 568.
79. 455 U.S. 489, 495-96 (1982).
80. 742 F.2d at 568; see also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) (discrimination in help-wanted ads); Camille Corp. v.
Phares, 705 F.2d 223, 227 n.2 (7th Cir. 1983) (drug paraphernalia ads); Florida Business-
men for Free Enter. v. City of Hollywood, 673 F.2d 1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 1982) (drug
paraphernalia ads); Casbah, Inc. v. Thone, 651 F.2d 551, 564 (8th Cir. 1981) (drug para-
phernalia ads), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1005 (1982). It is interesting to note, however, that
the court did not impose the imminent threat standard here, as it did in National Gay Task
Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1983) (advocating illegal conduct at
some indefinite future time is not regulable).
81. 742 F.2d at 569.
82. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 634; Weiler v. Carpenter, 695 F.2d 1348, 1350 (10th Cir.
1982).
83. 742 F.2d at 569 (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 618; Pennsylvania Accessories Trade
Assoc., Inc. v. Thornburgh, 565 F. Supp. 1568, 1572 (M.D. Pa. 1983)).
84. 742 F.2d at 569.
85. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
86. 408 U.S. at 108-09.
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ingest ... a controlled substance."' 8 7 The court admitted that taken in
isolation the "intended for use" language was ambiguous as to whether
the mens rea requirement of intent applied to the person charged with the
crime of possessing or delivering the forbidden articles or to the state of
mind of someone else in the chain of possession or delivery.8 8 The
court found that this deficiency was cured because, when the statute is
read as a whole, it becomes clear that the intention must be linked to
the party accused of performing the illegal act.
8 9
The Tenth Circuit held that this "scienter" requirement saved the
statute from being unconstitutionally vague.9 0 The vagueness of a crim-
inal statute may be cured if it includes a requirement that the violator
knows that what he does is illegal or probably illegal. 9 ' However, the
Tenth Circuit, in reading in such a high scienter requirement while vali-
dating the Act, actually has rendered it virtually unenforceable. The
paraphernalia vendor can simply argue that he had no intention for his
inventory to be used illegally. It seems that the primary intention of the
seller of paraphernalia (or any other wares for that matter) is for the
customer to buy it so that the seller makes a profit. It is impossible for
the seller of any product to know whether or not the buyer intends to
use it for a lawful purpose.
9 2
The court also found that some of the "logically relevant factors"
9 3
provided to guide law enforcement officials were vague, but, when taken
as a whole, provided objective criteria to enable police to evaluate par-
ticular circumstances. 94 Admitting that even law enforcement officials
are confused by the "logically relevant factors," the court held that the
issue of arbitrary enforcement was not ripe for decision. 9 5 In pre-en-
forcement challenges for vagueness, the main thrust of the court's in-
quiry is the notice requirement.
9 6
The Tenth Circuit found section 6 of the Act 9 7 an unconstitutional
taking of property without provision for a hearing, a violation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Section 6 made drug par-
aphernalia subject to seizure and forfeiture with no legal means of re-
dress by the owner.98 Although section 6 declared that "no property
right can exist" in drug paraphernalia, the court found that "sellers of
alleged drug paraphernalia have a vital property interest in their
87. See supra note 68 (emphasis added).
88. 742 F.2d at 570.
89. Id. at 570-71.
90. Id. at 573.
91. Id. (citing Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 67, 87 n.98 (1960)).
92. For example, could a gun dealer who sells "Saturday Night Specials" ever be
charged with intending them to be used in committing crimes? Such a result is unlikely to
become the law.
93. UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-4 (Supp. 1985).
94. 742 F.2d at 574.
95. Id.
96. Flipside, 455 U.S. at 503.
97. See supra note 72.




Seizure of property before notice and a hearing is permissible
under limited circumstances,10 0 but the requirements of due process are
violated by a statute permitting the seizure and forfeiture of property
without providing for any notice or hearing.' 0 1 While the seizure and
forfeiture section of the statute was found unconstitutional, the Tenth
Circuit found that it could be severed from the rest of the Act, which had
been held constitutional.1
0 2
III. DUE PROCESS: TERMINATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
In a trio of cases, the Tenth Circuit examined the constitutional in-
terests implicated and due process protections required in dismissing
government employees.
A. Military Employment and Homosexuality: Rich v. Secretary of the
Army
In Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 10 3 the plaintiff, Rich, brought suit
challenging his honorable discharge from the Army for fraudulent en-
listment. Rich was charged with deliberately concealing and misrepre-
senting his homosexuality on his reenlistment forms, and prior
statements he had made to his superiors were given as evidence in sup-
port of this allegation.'
0 4
The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Holloway, af-
firmed the decision of the trial court denying Rich's request for rein-
statement. The court first agreed that the Army's charge that Rich had
concealed and fraudulently misrepresented his homosexuality on the
enlistment forms was reached in accordance with Army regulations
which were neither arbitrary nor capricious, and was supported by the
substantial evidence of Rich's own admissions. 10 5 The court then pro-
ceeded to Rich's constitutional arguments.
1. Procedural Due Process
The Army procedures for discharging personnel for fraudulent en-
try do not require a hearing; Rich claimed that his discharge was there-
fore a violation of due process.I°6 A litigant must show that he has been
deprived of a protected liberty or property interest before he can claim
99. 742 F.2d at 577.
100. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (seizure of
yacht used for smuggling drugs); see also Casbah, 651 F.2d at 562 (seizure of drug
paraphernalia).
101. 742 F.2d at 577; see also Windfaire, Inc. v. Busbee, 523 F. Supp. 868, 872 (N.D. Ga.
1981) (provided post-seizure notice and hearing).
102. 742 F.2d at 578 (forfeiture clause "not so interwoven with the remainder of the
statute that the other portions of the Act cannot stand alone").
103. 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984).
104. 516 F. Supp. 623 (D. Colo. 1981).
105. 735 F.2d at 1225.
106. Id. at 1226.
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the protections of procedural due process. 10 7 The court, relying on
Board of Regents v. Roth 108 and Asbill v. Housing Authority of the Choctaw
Nation,'0 9 held that in order to be considered a property interest for
procedural due process purposes, the plaintiff must have a "legitimate
claim of entitlement" and not just an abstract desire to continue in his
position of employment. 10 The Tenth Circuit held that, because the
Army has the power to promulgate procedures for discharging person-
nel and had complied with those procedures, the plaintiff had no legiti-
mate claim of entitlement to his job: he had "no property interest in the
continuance of his Army Career."II1
The court next rejected Rich's contention that he had been de-
prived of a protected liberty interest without a hearing." 1 2 Rich claimed
that as a result of his discharge he had been unable to receive unemploy-
ment benefits or obtain alternative employment. 1 3 The federal courts
have recognized a protected liberty interest in one's reputation 1 4 and
freedom to take advantage of alternative means of employment. 115 The
Tenth Circuit limited redress for deprivation of these liberty interests,
however, by making recovery contingent upon proof that the harm to
plaintiff's reputation and future career had resulted from defendant's
"'"ublication of information which was false and stigmatizing.' "116
The court found that the Army did not publicize the grounds of
plaintiff's dismissal and only released the information to the Colorado
Department of Employment at the plaintiffs request."17 Therefore,
there was no deprivation of a liberty interest which would have entitled
Rich to a hearing."
18
107. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (no property interest in non-ten-
ured teaching position); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (implied property inter-
est in non-tenure teaching system).
108. 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (non-tenured professor had no claim of entitlement).
109. 756 F.2d 1499 (10th Cir. 1984) (employee of Housing Authority had no claim of
entitlement in continued employment).




114. Roth, 408 U.S. 564; Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (reputation
interest affected by posting notice forbidding sale of liquor to claimant); cf. Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693 (1976) (no reputation interest affected by distribution of photo indentifying
claimant as shoplifter).
115. Roth, 408 U.S. 564; Miller v. City of Mission, 705 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1983) (assis-
tant police chief stigmatized by public dissemination of reasons for firing).
116. 735 F.2d at 1227 (quoting Asbill, 756 F.2d at 1503 (emphasis in original)).
117. Id. See also Marwill v. Baker, 499 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (no deprivation
of liberty interest where publication of information is made by plaintiff or at his
insistance).
118. Refusing to rule on whether homosexuality was either a constitutionally protected
privacy interest or a suspect class for equal protection purposes, the court held that the




2. Substantive Due Process: Privacy
Following the district court, 11 9 the Tenth Circuit also relied heavily
upon Beller v. Middendorf'20 in denying the plaintiff's substantive due
process claim. 12 1 The court focused on the military's special need to
maintain a way of life different and separate from civilian life in consid-
ering the merits of Rich's claim.'
2 2
The court skirted the issue of whether or not homosexuality is pro-
tected by the constitutional right to privacy.' 23 The courts are divided
on this issue. 124 The Tenth Circuit held that, even assuming arguendo
that homosexuality was a protected privacy interest, the government had
an overriding interest in keeping the armed services heterosexual.'
2 5
3. First Amendment
Rich further argued that the Army's policy prohibiting homosexual-
ity infringed upon his first amendment rights to associate, discuss per-
sonal issues, or speak out for change of the system. 126 The Tenth
Circuit dismissed these arguments by explaining that Rich had been dis-
charged for falsifying enlistment forms regarding his sexual practices,
not for gay advocacy or or associating with homosexuals.' 2 7 Relying
upon Brown v. Glines 128 and Parker v. Levy,' 2 9 the court found that
whatever "incidental effect . . . the Army [regulations had] upon First
Amendment rights is entirely justified by the special needs of the
military."13
0
B. Civilian Employees: Walker v. United States
Walker v. United States 31 also dealt with falsifying information on
employment forms. However, in Walker the plaintiff was a probationary
civilian employee of the military. 132 He received notice that he was to
119. 516 F. Supp. at 625.
120. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980) (discharge of Navy personnel for homosexuality is
not a denial of due process), cert. denied sub nom. Beller v. Lehman, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
121. Rich argued that his military record proved there was no rational connection be-
tween his sexual orientation and his suitability for service. 735 F.2d at 1227.
122. Id. at 1227 n.7.
123. Id. at 1228.
124. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (anti-sod-
omy law upheld), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976); De Santis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608
F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (no homosexual constitutional protection from employment dis-
crimination); Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976) (no right to privacy protec-
tion from anti-sodomy law for married couple if third party present); cf New York v.
Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 415 N.E.2d 936 (1980) (anti-sodomy law inva-
lid as to consensual acts between adults), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
125. 735 F.2d at 1228.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1229.
128. 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (circulating petitions on Air Force bases).
129. 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (Army physician called for blacks to refuse to serve in
Vietnam).
130. 735 F.2d at 1229.
131. 744 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1984).
132. Id. at 68.
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be dismissed on the ground that he had falsified his employment appli-
cation. He was given five days to respond before his termination.
133
Despite Walker's written and oral denials of the allegations of falsifica-
tion, which were the only means of participation he was allowed in the
proceedings, the government found that the charges were supported by
substantial evidence and dismissed him.' 3 4 Walker brought suit claim-
ing that he had been deprived of liberty and property interests protected
by the due process clause.1
3 5
As in Rich, the Tenth Circuit held that the due process right to be
heard in a meaningful time and manner is only mandated when the lib-
erty or property interest of an individual has been adversely affected. 1
3 6
Following Board of Regents v. Roth, 13 7 the court found that as a probation-
ary employee, Walker did not have a sufficient entitlement to govern-
ment employment for his employment to qualify as a property interest
deserving the protections of procedural due process.'
3 8
In contrast to Rich, however, the court found that, because Walker
had been dismissed on the grounds of lying on his employment applica-
tion, his valuable liberty interest in his "good name, reputation and in-
tegrity, and . . . freedom to take advantage of other employment
opportunities"' 39 had been implicated. Relying on Miller v. City of Mis-
sion,140 the Tenth Circuit found that federal personnel procedures
14 l
which allowed disclosure of plaintiff's personnel file (containing the rea-
sons for his dismissal) to other federal and state agencies was both a
public dissemination of stigmatizing information and a barrier to his se-
curing future federal employment.14 2 It is notable that the Tenth Cir-
cuit did not take the opportunity to explain its denial of a similar
reputation-based liberty interest in Rich. However, Rich can be distin-
guished by the fact that Rich had requested the dissemination of his per-
sonnel records to the Colorado Department of Employment,143 whereas
in Walker the government had released the plaintiff's personnel records
to the State of Oklahoma and federal agencies without his
permission. 1
44
The Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that Walker
was not stigmatized by the release of his records because he could chal-
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
136. 744 F.2d at 68. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
137. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
138. 744 F.2d at 68.
139. Id. at 69.
140. 705 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1983) (public dissemination of reasons for assistant police
chief's firing).
141. Federal Personnel Manual, ch. 294, subch. 7-2-b (February 6, 1976); 5 C.F.R.
§ 294.702(c) (1983).
142. 744 F.2d at 69.
143. See supra text accompanying note 117.
144. 744 F.2d at 69.
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lenge the basis for his dismissal in a state administrative hearing. 14 5
The court found that Walker was entitled to procedural safeguards at
the time of his dismissal in order to avoid the stigma. "Appellant should
not be forced to reestablish his innocence every time he applies for ben-
efits or a job."'
46
The court then turned to the question of what process was due.
Miller requires that notice of the charges must be given a reasonable
time before a hearing in order to give the individual a meaningful op-
portunity to be heard. 14 7 Miller further requires that, except in ex-
tremely unusual situations, the individual must be given a pretermination
hearing in order to be afforded a meaningful time within which to be
heard. '
4 8
The Tenth Circuit found several defects with the termination proce-
dures employed against Walker. While not requiring a formal trial-type
proceeding, the Tenth Circuit held that Walker should have been given
the opportunity to confront the person or persons who alleged that he
had lied on his employment application. 149 The court also found that
the five days notice did not give the plaintiff adequate time to prepare
his defense. 150 In addition, the fact that the plaintiff's response to the
charges was heard by the same office which had made the initial decision
to terminate him led the court to conclude that this office could not be
the "impartial tribunal" required by the Constitution.' 5 ' In light of the
important liberty interests at stake, the court held that the government
had not complied with the requirements of procedural due process.'
5 2
C. Probationary Civil Service Employees: Sipes v. United States
The plaintiff in Sipes v. United States 153 alleged that his termination
as a preservation packager at an Air Force base was in retaliation for his
exercise of free speech.1 54 Sipes had complained to the Inspector Gen-
eral about what he maintained were discriminatory citations for infrac-
tions given by his superiors. Sipes further argued that his dismissal
arbitrarily deprived him of protected liberty and property interests in
violation of due process.'
55
If a Civil Service employee is discharged before working a full year,
he is not entitled to a pretermination hearing and other discharge proce-
145. Id. at 70. In fact Walker did challenge the allegation in front of the Oklahoma
Unemployment Commission successfully.
146. Id.




151. Id. at 71.
152. Id.
153. 744 F.2d 1418 (10th Cir. 1984).
154. Sipes got his job pursuant to the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-508, 88 Stat. 1578 (1974) (codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-5228 (1983)).
155. 744 F.2d at 1419.
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dures afforded permanent, nonprobationary employees.1 56 Again, the
Tenth Circuit, Judge Holloway writing, held that Sipes was required to
demonstrate that he had a liberty or property interest in continued em-
ployment before he could gain the protections of procedural due pro-
cess. Otherwise he must accept the procedures provided by statute or
regulation. The court held that, in this case, these procedures had been
complied with by the government.
15 7
Relying again on Board of Regents v. Roth 158 and, more specifically,
Walker v. United States,' 59 the court found that Sipes did not have a suffi-
cient claim of entitlement to his employment to create a property inter-
est protected by procedural due process. 16 0 The court rejected Sipes'
assertion that the goals behind the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment
Act (VEVRA) created an entitlement.161
The court also rejected Sipes' claim that his dismissal and conse-
quent ejection from the VEVRA program deprived him of a liberty inter-
est in his livelihood. Citing Asbill v. Housing Authority of the Choctaw
Nation 162 and Rich v. Secretary oftheArmy, 163 the court held that Sipes had
failed to show that his termination had stigmatic consequences resulting
from the publication of substantially false characterizations of the rea-
sons for his termination. 64 The court found both that the government
had not made public any information concerning Sipes' termination and
that the reasons given for his dismissal were not stigmatizing. 16 5
The Tenth Circuit's procedural due process analysis demonstrated
a judicial desire to keep clear of mundane personnel decisions made by
administrative agencies. The court's handling of Sipes' first amendment
claims also reflects this attitude. Sipes claimed that he was terminated
for complaining to the Inspector General about being discriminatorily
cited for infractions by his superiors. Following the Supreme Court in
Connick v. Myers,'1 66 the Tenth Circuit held that such communications by
a public employee are not expressions of opinion on matters of public
concern. The Tenth Circuit further held that the first amendment does
not require the court to look carefully into the discretion used by gov-
ernment officials in making personnel management decisions. Appar-
ently, in government personnel manners, the court will not strictly
scrutinize what may be retaliations for expressions of personal
concerns. 1
6 7
156. Id. at 1420 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 4303(f) (1983)).
157. Id.
158. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
159. 726 F.2d 1499 (10th Cir. 1984). See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
160. 744 F.2d at 1421.
161. Id.
162. 726 F.2d 1499 (10th Cir. 1984).
163. 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984).
164. 744 F.2d at 1421-22. The government did not "call into question the plaintiff's
good name, reputation, honor, and integrity." Id. at 1422.
165. Id. at 1423.
166. 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (assistant district attorney fired after opposing a transfer and
circulating a questionnaire on department policy).
167. 744 F.2d at 1423.
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IV. ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES AND DUE PROCESS: RAZATOS
K COLORADO SUPREMJE COURT
A. Facts
In Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 168 the plaintiff, Razatos, sought
a declaratory judgment that Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 252,169
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 70 Rule
252 governs the procedures of an attorney disciplinary hearing before
the Colorado Supreme Court.
Grievances filed against Razatosl7 were heard by a three-member
Hearings Committee according to Rule 249.172 The Committee recom-
mended that Razatos' license to practice law be suspended for three
years. 173 The Committee's findings were approved by a Hearing Panel
which prepared a report which was adopted by the Colorado Supreme
Court.' 7 4 After Razatos' request for rehearing was denied he appealed
to the United States Supreme Court, but his appeal was denied.
17 5
B. The District Court Decision
Razatos then brought suit in United States District Court. The dis-
trict court held that since the jurisdiction for discipline of Colorado at-
torneys lies with the Colorado Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court (the only court with appellate jurisdiction over the high-
est court in the state), the district court lacked original jurisdiction over
Razatos' claim. In addition, the district court felt that federal district
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over these matters. 17 6 Because
the district court found that Razatos failed to raise a federal question,
the court declined to hold that the disciplinary procedure outlined in
Rule 252 violated due process.
177
168. 746 F.2d 1429 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2019 (1985).
169. The attorney disciplinary rules, COLO. R. Civ. P. 241-59, were repealed effective
January 1, 1982. They were replaced by COLO. R. Civ. P. 241.1-.25. 746 F.2d at 1431 n.1.
COLO. R. Civ. P. 252 was reenacted as COLO. R. Civ. P. 241.20.
170. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
171. Razatos was both a real estate broker and an attorney. The disciplinary hearings
arose over a transaction in which Razatos represented a client in the purchase of a bar.
The issue was whether Razatos was adequately representing his client in the capacity of an
attorney, or whether he was merely acting as a real estate broker. 746 F.2d at 1431 (citing
plaintiff's amended complaint).
172. The Hearings Committee holds a formal hearing in which witnesses are sworn and
a complete record is developed. The Committee report is submitted to a nine-man Hear-
ings Panel. If a majority of the panel approves a report finding wrong-doing, the panel
makes recommendations to the Colorado Supreme Court for appropriate disciplinary ac-
tion. COLO. R. Civ. P. 249.
173. 549 F. Supp. 798, 799 (D. Colo. 1982), afd, 746 F.2d 1429 (10th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2019 (1985).
174. People v. Razatos, 636 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1981), appeal dismissed sub nom. Razatos v.
Colorado Supreme Court, 455 U.S. 930 (1982).
175. Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 455 U.S. 930 (1982) (appeal dismissed for
lack of a substantial federal question).
176. 549 F. Supp. at 801.
177. Id.
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C. The Tenth Circuit Decision
Writing for the Tenth Circuit, Judge Seymour overturned the trial
court, ruling that it did have subject matter jurisdiction over the issues
in this case.' 7 8 Relying on District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feld-
man,179 the court stated that a federal district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the judicial decisions of a state supreme court when the
state court takes on a non-judicial function, such as the promulgation of
rules for attorney discipline. However, a federal district court does have
jurisdiction to resolve constitutional and other federal issues.180
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's rejection of
Razatos' argument that where the credibility of a witness is of the utmost
importance to a case, it is a denial of due process if the final arbiter of
fact does not personally hear the testimony. 18 1 The court relied on the
flexible due process analysis employed by the Supreme Court in evaluat-
ing what process is due when liberty or property interests are threatened
in other than formal judicial proceedings.' 8 2 Flexible due process re-
quires a three-step inquiry into the nature of the individual interest af-
fected, namely: (1) the risk of the erroneous deprivation of that interest
through the challenged procedures; (2) the probable value of any addi-
tional procedural safeguards; and, (3) the governmental interest in ad-
ministrative efficiency.18 3 In balancing these interests, the Tenth Circuit
relied heavily upon the interpretation of this three-step analysis em-
ployed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Raddatz.
18 4
The Razatos court first found that the plaintiff did indeed have a
crucial liberty interest in pursuing his profession as a lawyer and was
entitled to procedural due process protections. 185 Although the court
characterized the attorney disciplinary hearings as "quasi-criminal.," be-
cause of the possibility of losing one's livelihood, it held that such disci-
plinary hearings do not require the elaborate procedural protections
afforded a defendant in a criminal trial.18 6
The court rejected Razatos' allegations that the Hearings Commit-
tee's determinations as to credibility were unreliable and thus presented
the risk of erroneous determination. 18 7 The Tenth Circuit found that
review of the Heaiings Committee's findings of fact, first by the Hear-
178. 746 F.2d at 1434.
179. 460 U.S. 462 (1983). In Feldman, a Virginia attorney attacked the constitutionality
of a District of Columbia rule which required completion of law school to qualify for the
bar. The Court held that the district court did not have jurisdiction, but only because the
rule was "inextricably intertwined" with the state court decision. Id. at 486-87.
180. 746 F.2d at 1432-33.
181. Id. at 1434.
182. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
183. Id. at 335.
184. 477 U.S. 667 (1980). In Raddatz, the Court upheld a provision in the Federal
Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1982), which allowed a district court to use a
record developed during a magistrate's hearing to decide a motion to suppress.
185. 746 F.2d at 1435.




ings Panel and then by the Colorado Supreme Court, was sufficient evi-
dence that Colorado's procedures adequately guarded against an
erroneous determination.1 88 The fact that the plaintiff was permitted to
file exceptions to the Hearings Panel's report, that the issues were ex-
tensively briefed, and that the "clear and convincing evidence" standard
of fact finding was employed, bolstered the credibility of the Colorado
Supreme Court's final decision. The court also found that, although not
expressly provided for in the rules of procedure, the state supreme court
retained the power to rehear the case de novo if it questioned the report
of the Hearings Panel.189
Finally, the Tenth Circuit found that the interest in protecting the
public from incompetent and corrupt lawyers ranks high among impor-
tant state interests. 190 The court held that the administrative process,
with the present procedural safeguards, served this interest while free-
ing the state supreme court from the time consuming task of personally
developing the record in disciplinary proceedings. 19 1 Therefore, plac-
ing additional fact finding burdens upon the supreme court is unwar-
ranted so long as the court properly exercises its discretion in
conducting de novo review of the findings of fact in the appropriate cir-
cumstances. 192 Razatos' case did not present that set of circumstances.
V. BALLOT ACCESS: BLOMQUIST V. THomsoN
A. Facts
In Blomquist v. Thomson 193 the plaintiffs, members of the Wyoming
Libertarian Party, brought suit against the defendant in her official ca-
pacity as Wyoming Secretary of State, claiming that certain sections of
the Wyoming Election Code 19 4 violated the right of freedom of associa-
tion and the right to cast votes effectively under the first and fourteenth
amendments.1
95
Where fundamental constitutional rights are adversely affected by
state law, the state has the burden of proving that the law serves a com-
pelling interest and employs the means least burdensome to those rights
in order to serve that interest. 19 6 Wyoming conceded that the ballot
access provisons affected fundamental constitutional rights of the plain-
tiffs while the plaintiffs conceded that the ballot restriction provisions
served legitimate interests of the state. 19 7 Therefore, the question to be
188. Id. at 1436.
189. Id. at 1434.
190. Id. at 1436.
191. Id. at 1437.
192. Id.
193. 739 F.2d 525 (10th Cir. 1984).
194. Wyo. STAT. §§ 22-1-101 to -26-121 (1977).
195. Blomquist v. Thomson, 591 F. Supp. 768, 769-70 (D. Wyo. 1984).
196. Id. at 770; see Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S.
173, 184-85 (1979) (ballot access restrictions in Chicago could not be stricter than state-
wide); American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 780-81 (1974) (upheld minority
party ballot restrictions as meeting compelling state interest).
197. 591 F. Supp. at 774. The state required that a party demonstrate a modicum of
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resolved was whether the state had chosen the least restrictive means of
accomplishing its goal.
B. The District Court Decision
The district court found that the challenged provisions made it im-
possible for a new political party to get on the ballot within a year of a
general election. 198 New parties were put at a distinct disadvantage as
compared to the established parties (i.e., the Republican and Democratic
parties). 19 9 The district court held that the election code unduly bur-
dened plaintiffs' rights: "a state's election laws cannot operate to freeze
the political status quo."' 20 0 However, because the Wyoming Legisla-
ture was in session at the time, the court deferred ordering remedial
action, allowing the state to amend its election code.
2 0 1
The district court's major concern was over the fact that a new party
had to wait over two years to get on the ballot. 20 2 The Wyoming Legis-
lature subsequently amended the code to allow a new party seeking bal-
lot access to file a petition by June 1 of any election year, containing the
signatures of 8,000 voters, the majority of whom could not be residents
of the same county. 20 3 The parties agreed to a compromise on the sig-
nature requirement since the plaintiffs had only two months left to file
the petition before the 1984 election. 20 4 In approving the amended
election code, the district court rejected the compromise worked out be-
tween the parties for the 1984 election year. The plaintiffs appealed on
the grounds that the two-county rule,20 5 as well as the 8,000 signature
requirement as it applied to the Wyoming Libertarian party in the 1984
election year, were unconstitutional.
2 0 6
C. The Tenth Circuit Decision
In analyzing the amended Wyoming Election Code the Tenth Cir-
cuit followed the framework set out by the Supreme Court in Anderson v.
support before granting it official recognition. The state sought to avoid frivolous candi-
dacies, expensive run-off elections, and voter confusion from crowded ballots. Id.
198. Under the election code, a candidate from a minor party was required to file over
two years prior to a general election. In addition, the candidate was required to raise
sufficient support in a petition as well as having received ten percent of the vote in the last
general election in order to be listed on the ballot as an independent candidate. 591 F.
Supp. at 775 n.7.
199. Id. at 774. "[W]e must conclude that most of the provisions within the Code as-
sume the existence of a two-party system consisting of Democratic and Republican par-
ties." Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 777. The court took judicial notice of the fact that the Wyoming Legislature
had returned to session.
202. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
203. 739 F.2d at 526.
204. They compromised at a requirement of 1,333 signatures. Id.
205. " 'To be valid, a petition shall contain the signatures of not less than eight thou-
sand (8,000) registered electors eligible to vote in this state, the majority of whom may not
reside in the same county.' " 739 F.2d at 527 (quoting Wyo. STAT. § 22-4-201(d) (1984) (em-
phasis by the court)).
206. 739 F.2d at 526.
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Celebrezze. 20 7 Anderson requires a court to weigh the "character and mag-
nitude"20 8 of the alleged harm to the plaintiffs' first and fourteenth
amendment rights against the interests which the state claims will justify
the burden on the plaintiffs' rights.
20 9
The court noted that signature limitations by county in ballot access
rules had been found in previous cases to be a violation of the principal
of voter equality.2 10 The Tenth Circuit held that Wyoming's two-county
rule fell within this class of ballot access rules which substantially burden
individual rights. 2 1 1 The court then weighed the state's interests as-
serted against the burden on the plaintiffs' rights. The court rejected
the state's argument that the two-county rule was necessary to discour-
age fraud or to ensure that the new party had a fairly broad base of
support before it was added to the ballot.2 12 The state offered no ra-
tionale or evidence to support its contention that the rule discouraged
fraud. Likewise, the Tenth Circuit found that no compelling interest
was served by ensuring that the new party's support was geographically
diverse and, therefore, struck down the two-county rule.
2 13
Based upon the Anderson analysis, the court held that the June 1
deadline was burdensome to the plaintiffs' right of political association
because it fell before the most advantageous time to garner support,
after the major party primaries, when the major parties have offered
their platforms and candidates to the public. 21 4 The court found that
the time constraints placed on this particular party in the 1984 election
year were unreasonable. Due to the litigation, the time remaining for
the plaintiffs to obtain the requisite 8,000 signatures was severely
limited.
2 15
The Tenth Circuit stopped short of invalidating theJune 1 deadline
and never actually addressed the issue of whether the state had a valid
interest in requiring 8,000 signatures for a new party to gain ballot ac-
cess. The court found that because the defendants had earlier agreed to
a compromise of 1,333 signatures for 1984 (which the plaintiffs had sur-
passed) 21 6 they could not later argue that they had a compelling state
interest in requiring 8,000 signatures. 2 17 This narrow holding was ap-
207. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
208. 739 F.2d at 525 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
209. 739 F.2d at 525.
210. Moore v. Ogilvie, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (requirement that independent candidates'
petitions include at least 200 signatures from at least 50 of the state's 102 counties dis-
criminates against the more populous counties in violation of equal protection clause);
Communist Party v. State Bd. of Elections, 518 F.2d 517 (7th Cir.) (requirement that not
more than 13,000 of 25,000 mandatory signatures come from the same county violates the
right to vote effectively), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986 (1975).
211. 739 F.2d 528.
212. Id. at 529.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 528.
215. Id. at 528-29.
216. Id. at 529.
217. Id. "We do not see how the State can argue on appeal that it has a compelling
interest in plaintiffs meeting the 8,000 signature requirement this year when it specifically
19861
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
plied only to this particular plaintiff and solely for the purposes of the
1984 election. Although the court expressed strong disapproval of the
June 1 deadline, a decision on the constitutionality of that provision
awaits future litigation.
VI. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION UNDER
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE: TAXPAYERS FOR ANIMAS-LA PLATA
REFERENDUM (TAR) v. NIMAS-LA PLATA WATER
CONSERVANCY DisTRIcT
2 1 8
The Tenth Circuit's decision in TAR was an "important and unusual
appeal involv[ing] several constitutional issues."'2 19 The outcome of




The Water Conservancy Act 22 ' was enacted by the Colorado legis-
lature in 1937 to aid in the financing of local water projects. 22 2 The
keystone of this Act was the establishment of water conservancy districts
with the power to raise finances through the levy of ad valorem taxes.
22 -3
The Act allowed for the creation of a district by collecting the signa-
tures of twenty-five percent of the irrigated land owners and five percent
of the non-irrigated land owners on a petition submitted for approval to
the district court for the county in which all or part of the proposed
water conservancy district was to be situated. 224 Opponents of the
water conservancy district could force a referendum on the issue by fil-
ing a petition in the district court opposing the establishment of the dis-
trict, signed by twenty-five percent of the irrigated land owners and five
percent of the non-irrigated land owners.
22 5
In 1979, the Animas-La Plata Conservancy District successfully filed
a petition with the district court. 226 The plaintiff, Taxpayers for
Animas-La Plata Referendum (TAR), concerned about the environmen-
tal impact of the project, spent $10,000 in an unsuccessful petition
drive.2 2 7 The district court decreed that the Animas-La Plata Conser-
vancy District was officially organized in compliance with the Act.2 28
agreed below that 1,333 signatures would satisfy that interest due to the shortened time
for obtaining signatures." Id. at 529.
218. 739 F.2d 1472 (10th Cir. 1984).
219. Id. at 1474.
220. See infra text accompanying notes 244-46.
221. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-45-101 to -152 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1985).
222. 739 F.2d at 1474.
223. Id.
224. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-45-109 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1985). The statute has addi-
tional requirements for the minimum number of signatures and a land value and owner-
ship statement.
225. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-45-112(2)(b), (5)(b) (1973).





The plaintiff then sought to attack the procedures used to create the
conservancy district in federal court, alleging that the Water Conser-
vancy Act violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment.
22 9
Faced with the possibility that every water conservancy district in
Colorado would be vulnerable to a similar attack if the Water Conser-
vancy Act was found invalid, the state's legislature expeditiously passed
House Bill 1272.230 The bill retroactively validated and recreated each
existing water conservancy district in the state, including Animas-La
Plata. 23 t In response to the legislature's action, TAR amended its com-
plaint to attack the constitutionality of House Bill 1272.232 The district
court upheld the constitutionality of the bill and, therefore, held that the
plaintiff's claims for declarative and injunctive relief were moot. 23 3 On
appeal, TAR renewed its attack on the constitutionality of House Bill
1272. TAR first alleged that the bill violated the supremacy clause of
the United States Constitution. 23 4 They also claimed that the bill con-
stituted retroactive legislation and, as such, was violative of due
process.235
B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
1. The Supremacy Clause
The plaintiff argued that the Colorado legislature's passage of
House Bill 1272 was an unconstitutional attempt to defeat the federal
court's jurisdiction over a federal question. 23 6 The Tenth Circuit, Judge
Barret writing, reviewed several Supreme Court cases which had found
certain state actions to be usurpations of federal court jurisdiction over
federal controversies. 23 7 The court found the instant case easily distin-
guishable. The Supreme Court cases had all involved attempts by the
states to divest the federal courts. of their power to adjudicate federal
issues. 23 8 In TAR, the Colorado legislature had, in effect, made the
229. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
230. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-45-153 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1985).
231. 739 F.2d 1475. The court parenthetically observed that an amendment to exclude
the Animas La-Plata district from House Bill 1272 was rejected by the legislature.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
235. 739 F.2d at 1476. TAR also claimed that the bill violated art. H, § I I of the Colo-
rado Constitution which prohibits laws with retroactive operation. For the purposes of
this article, the state constitutional claims will not be addressed.
236. 739 F.2d at 1475.
237. See, e.g., General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12 (1977) (state court injunction
barred bringing suit in federal court); Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964)
(state court injunction barred appeal to a federal court); Harrison v. St. Louis & San Fran-
cisco R.R., 232 U.S. 318 (1914) (state law revoked charter of railroad which asserted diver-
sity of citizenship to remove suit to federal court); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378
(1914) (Governor of Texas declared martial law in order to restrain production of oil
well); United States v. Peters, 9 U.S.(5 Cranch) 115 (1809) (state refused to honor admi-
ralty court judgment reversing state admiralty court).
238. See, e.g., Genral Atomic, 434 U.S. 12; Donovan, 377 U.S. 408. In both cases the state
court enjoined litigants from bringing an action in federal court.
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plaintiffs cause of action moot.2'- ' t There was no effort to remove the
case from the federal court's jurisdiction. Indeed, the district court had
exercised its jurisdiction by dismissing the action on the ground that the
plaintiffs claim, in light of House Bill 1272, no longer presented ajusti-
ciable "case or controversy. ' 12 4t" Relying on Kremens v. Bartler 24 and
Hall v. Beals,'2 4 2 the court held that in remedying the unconstitutional
characteristics of existing legislation, state legislatures may moot ex-
isting law suits.
2 43
2. Due Process-Retroactive Legislation
The plaintiffs retroactive legislation claim was based on the theory
that its right to litigate this claim had been denied by the legislature's
action. Relying on Supreme Court decisions that stress the importance
of vesting rights in retroactive legislation claims, 2 44 the Tenth Circuit
denied TAR's due process claim as well. While the courts will not toler-
ate legislative interference with a fully adjudicated right, legislation that
moots pending claims and thereby eradicates accrued rights of action
has been upheld by the Supreme Court.
24 5
The court held TAR's claim "inchoate" and, therefore, an insuffi-
cient basis upon which to challenge an otherwise valid statute.' 4 6 in so
doing, the Tenth Circuit avoided a decision which might have resulted
in a revolution in the development of Colorado's water resources. Un-
less the legislature amends the Water Conservancy Act, however, it will
be faced with passing legislation to validate each new district through
"reenactment" or face the possibility of a legion of future lawsuits like
TAR.
John lcCarthy
239. 739 F.2d at 1476. The court noted that even had the legislature intended to moot
TAR's suit, the bill was not in violation of the supremacy clause.
240. U.S. CoNsr. art. Ill, § 2.
241. 431 U.S. 119 (1977) (voluntarv commitment to mental hospital of minor children
by their parents mooted by change of statute).
242. 396 U.S. 45 (1969) (Colorado voting residency requirement changed from six
months to two months, mooting claim).
243. 739 F.2d at 1476.
244. FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958) (amendment to Veterans' Emergency
Housing Act of 1945): Swayne & Hovt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297 (1937) (Act
affirmed Secretary of State's power to regulate shipping); Graham v. Goodcell, 282 U.S.
409 (1931) (amendment to Internal Revenue Act): Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.S. 600 (1923)
(consolidation of school district validated by legislation).
245. 739 F.2d at 1477 (citing Graham. 282 U.S. 409 (1931): Louisville & Nashville R.R.
v. Mottlev. 219 U.S. 467 (1911): McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102 (1848).
246. Id.
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